Abstract. The block cipher RC2 was designed in 1989 by Ron Rivest for RSA Data Security Inc. In this paper we describe both the cipher and preliminary attempts to use both di erential and linear cryptanalysis.
Introduction
RC2 is a block cipher 5 that was designed in 1989 by Ron Rivest for RSA Data Security, Inc. Initially held as a con dential and proprietary algorithm, RC2 was published as an Internet Draft during 1997 12] . RC2 has many i n teresting and unique design features, particularly so when one considers the style of ciphers that dominated both the literature and the market at the time of its invention. The cipher was intended to be particularly e cient on 16-bit processors and with a 64-bit block size it was intended as a drop-in replacement for DES 11] . A signi cant feature of RC2 is the exibility o ered to the user in terms of the e ective key-size. This has now become a common feature of many block cipher proposals and it is a property that has proven to be important in commercial applications. Over the years RC2 has been deployed widely and it features prominently in the S/MIME secure messaging standard 5]. Currently there are no published results on the cryptanalytic strength of RC2. As a rst step this paper sets out some details on how the basic attacks of di erential 1] and linear 8] cryptanalysis might a p p l y .
derived. Then a 64-bit plaintext block is encrypted using array K ]. Encryption consists of two s t yles of rounds. One is termed a MIXING round and the other a MASHING round. Both the key expansion and encryption components rely on the use of a substitution table called PITABLE. This table speci es a random permutation on the integers 0 : : : 255 and was derived from the expansion of = 3 :14159 : : : . The table itself will not concern us directly in this paper, but it is included for completeness in the Appendix. We w i l l n o w describe the action of RC2 in more detail. We will use x < << k to denote the 16-bit word x rotated left by k bits, & will denote bitwise logical AND, will denote bitwise exclusive-or and will denote bitwise complementation. All 16-bit word addition + is performed modulo 2 16 .
Key Expansion
During the key expansion procedure both byte operations and 16-bit word operations are used. The array K ] that stores the 64 16-bit round keys will be referred to in two w ays. a) For word operations the positions of the bu er will be referred to as Suppose that T bytes of key are supplied by the user with 1 T 128. The key expansion procedure places the T-byte key into L 0], ..., L T ; 1] of the key bu er. Regardless of the value of T however, the algorithm has a maximum e ective k ey length in bits that is denoted T1. The e ective key length in bytes T8 a n d a m a s k T M based on the e ective k ey length in bits T1 are derived as T8 = dT 1=8e and T M = 2 5 5 m o d 2 8(1;T8)+T1 .
Key expansion consists of the following two loops and intermediate step:
1. for i = T T+ 
Encryption and Decryption
The encryption operation is de ned in terms of primitive MIX Decryption is the reverse of encryption. Since the details can easily be established they are not included here. Test vectors for encryption using RC2 are provided in the Appendix.
Features of RC2
RC2 is rather unusual in that the 64-bit plaintext block is split into four words each o f 1 6 b i t s . I n a s t yle reminiscent of the hash function MD4 13] , much of the encryption process relies on one of these words being modi ed by a function of the other three, the four words then beingswapped cyclically. This design approach w as explored some seven years after the design of RC2, which n o w might be described as being an \unbalanced Feistel cipher" 4].
The key schedule for RC2 is also unusual. T8 is the number of bytes needed to contain the given T1 bits of key. When T1 is congruent t o k, modulo 8, a mask T M containing ones in the low-order k bits is used to derive the correct e ective k ey length. The rst step of the key expansion expands the key to a full 128 bytes, using a non-linear byte-wide feedback shift-register approach.
Step three is similar to the rst, except that it starts at the high end and works towards the lower end. Steps two a n d three also work together to limit the e ective k ey size to T1 bits.
Step three corresponds to using a feedback register of only T8 b ytes, and step two ensures that the initial state of that register has only T1 bits of entropy. Although the procedure limits the actually entropy o f t h e k ey to T1 bits, it also ensures that the nal key table depends upon each bit of the supplied key. If one supplies a 16-byte key, but set T1 = 4 0 , then changing any bit of the supplied key should result in a di erent k ey table, although the number of possible key tables is limited to 2 40 .
3 Di erential Cryptanalysis of RC2 Di erential cryptanalysis 1] can be a powerful style of attack. By choosing a pair of plaintexts with a particular di erence, which can be adapted to the cipher in question, the cryptanalyst hopes that some identi able, and unusual behavior, can be observed by processing the ciphertexts. One possible evolution of the di erence between a pair of plaintexts during encryption can be described by a characteristic. In essence, a characteristic speci es the di erence between two parallel encryptions at each s t a g e of the encryption process and there is some associated probability that a pair being encrypted does indeed follow this description. A plaintext pair that follows the characteristic is typically called a right pair. A pair that does not is called a wrong pair. Throughout our attack o n R C2, we shall de ne the di erence between two 16-bit words A and B to be A B. Furthermore in our analysis we shall be interested in how single-bit di erences behave within RC2. The decision to restrict our attention to single-bit di erences facilitates analysis but is also motivated by a t ypical assumption that characteristics involving multiple-bit di erences over integer addition will generally hold with lower probability than single-bit characteristics 6]. We note that other more complex techniques 2, 7] might o p e n new avenues for the analysis of RC2.
We will use et to denote the 16-bit word with a single one bit in position t from the right, all other bits being set to zero. We also view the leftmost bit of a 16-bit word to be the most signi cant bit. Thus we shall use e15 to denote a 16-bit word with the only non-zero bit being the most signi cant b i t . W e will denote the word of 16 zero bits as 0000x where the subscript x denotes hexadecimal notation and we will denote the Hamming weight (i.e. the number of ones in the binary expansion of some quantity x) as Hwt(x).
For the remainder of the paper, we shall consider MIXING and MASHING rounds in the following way. Instead of viewing the operation at each step as acting on a di erent word we shall consider the operations to be identical (i.e., at each MIX 
Some Basic Characteristics for MIX
Given an input di erence (et 0000x 0000x 0000x) to the rst MIX step in a MIXING round, the output di erence before rotation will be (et 0000x 0000x 0000x) with probability p 1=2. Rotation then moves this single bit di erence within the word, and the four words are swapped cyclically. We can summarize the four basic characteristics which hold with probability p 1=2 (when averaged over all plaintexts and key words) for a MIX step. The value of the rotation s i] depends on the step i in which the characteristic is applied. Note that addition within the subscript of et is to be performed modulo 16.
(et 0000x 0000x 0000x) ! (0000x 0000x 0000x e t+s i] ) (1) (0000x 0000x 0000x et) ! (0000x 0000x et 0000x) (2) (0000x 0000x et 0000x) ! (0000x et 0000x 0000x) (3) (0000x et 0000x 0000x) ! (et 0000x 0000x 0000x) (4) Apart from (1) with t = 15 which holds with probability p = 1, these characteristics hold with probability p = 1 =2 o n a verage. There are times where the characteristics do not hold. The following are the cases where the characteristic hold with certainty:
In the rst MIXING round, the attacker chooses the plaintext and this allows the cryptanalyst to capture some of these special cases in an attack.
Some Basic Characteristics for MASH
There are two MASHING rounds in RC2 and the basic MASH step is R 0] =
Towards a Di erential Attack on RC2
In this section we combine characteristics for both MIXING and MASHING rounds while moving towards a full analysis of RC2. We will assume that the subkey words K 0], : : : , K 63] are independent a n d w e aim to recover the expanded key table K ] in our attack.
The characteristics of interest are built around single-bit di erences and as noted in Section 3.1 there are advantages to having this single nonzero bit in the most signi cant b i t o f a w ord. Depending on which w ord R ] is the subject of the characteristic we use, di erent rotation amounts feature during MIXING. This leads to conditions on t, the position of the single-bit di erence in the plaintext, that provide some advantages in an attack. Another consideration is the presence of the MASHING rounds and one aim might b e t o n ullify their action. If a one-bit characteristic speci es an input di erence to a MASHING round of et in any one of the words, then provided t = 15 the characteristic will pass through the MASHING round unhindered with probability p = 1 . I f 5 < t < 15 then there is a characteristic that holds with probability p = 1 =2. There are six MIXING rounds between the two MASHING rounds and so with the di erence (et 0000x 0000x 0000x) as input to the rst MASHING round we can establish the values of t that are useful to us.
A more accurate re ection of the success of a nal attack i s g i v en by considering di erentials 10] instead of characteristics (which provide only a l o wer bound to the probability o f the di erential). In Section 3.5 we will consider the issue of di erentials in more detail but from this point on we will anticipate later analysis by referring to the use of di erentials during our description of the attack. The observations provided so far allow us to present i n T able 1 the di erentials that are useful to us.
Recovering Key Information
In a di erential cryptanalytic attack the attacker typically chooses a di erential for (n ; 1) rounds of an n-round block cipher. The attacker then tries to deduce key information from the last round of the cipher 1]. Here, the most e ective attack o n R C2 appears to require that bits of the subkey K 0] used in the rst MIXING round are recovered rst. Consider a di erential with input di erence (0000x 0000x 0000x et).
The starting values of R 1] and R 2] are chosen so that (R 1] & et) = (R 2] & et). After the rst MIX step the di erence will be (0000x 0000x et 0000x). The output di erence from the second MIX step will depend on the value of bit t in register R 3] . If this bit is zero then word R 1] with di erence 0000x will be chosen. Otherwise word R 2] with di erence et will be selected and a di erence will be introduced into another word. Note that the value of this bit depends on the plaintext (which w e k n o w) and on bits of the rst 16-bit subkey word K 0].
We can trace the output of the second MIX step to the end of the penultimate MIXING round by using the di erentials in Table 1 . If the pair is a right pair then we can recover one bit of information from K 0] as follows. A necessary condition for a pair to be a good pair is that
plaintext di erence di erence a t s t a r t o f prob. values of t last MIXING round (e t 0000 x 0000 x 0000 x ) (e t+15 0000 x 0000 x 0000 x ) 2 ;58 4 (e t 0000 x 0000 x 0000 x ) (e t+15 0000 x 0000 x 0000 x ) 2 ;59 1, 2, 3 (0000 x e t 0000 x 0000 x ) (0000 x e t+14 0000 x 0000 x ) 2 ;58 5 (0000 x e t 0000 x 0000 x ) (0000 x e t+14 0000 x 0000 x ) 2 ;59 1, 3 (0000 x e t 0000 x 0000 x ) (0000 x e t+14 0000 x 0000 x ) 2 ;60 0, 2, 4 (0000 x 0000 x e t 0000 x ) (0000 x 0000 x e t+13 0000 x ) 2 ;58 14 (0000 x 0000 x e t 0000 x ) (0000 x 0000 x e t+13 0000 x ) 2 ;59 7, : : : , 1 3 (0000 x 0000 x 0000 x e t ) (0000 x 0000 x 0000 x e t+11 ) 2 ;58 6 (0000 x 0000 x 0000 x e t ) (0000 x 0000 x 0000 x e t+11 ) 2 ;59 15, 0, : : : , 5 Table 1 . 26 di erentials that are potentially useful in an attack o n R C2. The associated probabilities are lower bounds provided by the analysis of a characteristic contained within the speci ed di erential. 
To m o u n t an attack t o r e c o ver bit (t;1) of k for some given t we encrypt plaintext pairs with z = 0 u n til we obtain a right pair. Once we h a ve a right pair we observe the value of y. F rom this we deduce the value of bit (t;1) in k and hence in K 0]. We can then repeat this approach c hoosing pairs with di erent v alues to z so that information on the subkey K 0] is recovered bit by b i t .
By using di erent di erentials with di erent values of t (see Table 1) we are able to introduce some error-checking into the attack 6 . In this way the bits of K 0] that we recover can be veri ed. All recovered bits of K 0] have to be correct before the next bit of K 0] can be correctly derived. Note that structures 1] can be useful in reducing the plaintext requirements for a di erential attack when more than one di erential is useful. With n useful di erentials we can ask for a structure of 2 n plaintexts with speci cally chosen di erences. From these we derive 2 n;1 plaintext pairs for each o f t h e n characteristics.
There remains the issue of detecting when a data pair is a good pair. We note that the di erence at the start of the nal MIXING round has Hamming weight one for a good pair. We m i g h t therefore measure the Hamming weight of the ciphertext and if the weight i s l e s s than some threshold the pair can be considered a right pair. Depending on the threshold we might accept some wrong pairs as being right pairs, something that would provide a wrong answer to the bit we wish to recover with probability 1 =2. To improve the robustness of the attack one might aim to collect more right pairs. Then the value of the bit suggested most often can be assumed to be the correct value to the key bit we are trying to recover. As a demonstration we provide the success rate for di erent amounts of plaintext in experiments on eight-round RC2. (There are eight MIXING rounds with a MASHING inserted after round ve as occurs in RC2.) A decision on whether a good pair had occurred was made according to whether the Hamming weight of the di erence in the ciphertext was less than some threshold. Then, once a value for the key bit had been counted more than the other (this di erence being denoted by excess) that value for the key bit was set. Each e n try in the 
The E ectiveness of Di erential Cryptanalysis
As we previously mentioned it is di erentials and their probabilities that re ect the e ectiveness of a di erential attack. Whereas a characteristic describes one speci c evolution of di erences through encryption, from a given starting di erence there might well have been other \paths" through the cipher to the same target di erence than the one described by one particular characteristic. With RC2 this leads to a particularly interesting interaction between the MIXING and MASHING rounds. First we will consider in abstract terms the probability that a one-bit di erence in some word a produces a one-bit di erence in the word d when we de ne d = a+b+c for unknown constants b and c. One approach might be to consider this as two separate additions and to consider the intermediate word e = a+b rst. Since a one-bit di erence in a produces a one-bit di erence in e with probability 1=2 and a one-bit di erence in e provides a one-bit di erence in d = e + c with probability 1 =2 w e would say that the characteristic over the two additions has probability 1=4. However it would then be misleading to use this characteristic to provide an approximation to the probability of the di erential from a to d. Instead, the probability of the propagation of a one-bit di erence from a to d is 1=2 since b + c i s a x e d v alue. Consequently the probability o f the di erential from a to d must also be 1=2.
Recall that the probability of the di erential is given by t h e s u m o f t h e probabilities of all the characteristics that satisfy the di erential. By looking at two successive additions in isolation we inadvertently restrict our attention to single-bit di erences in the intermediate value e. Let , 0 n ; 1, denote the position of the one bit di erence in a. A one-bit di erence in a will give a di erence in e with Hamming weight h with probability 2 ;h , 1 h < n ; , and with probability 2 ;n+ +1 for h = n ; . Since this h-bit di erence was caused by a one-bit di erence in the previous step 7 an h-bit di erence in e will be transformed to a one-bit di erence in d by the addition of c with probability 1 =2. Thus we g e t p = 2 ;1 (2 ;n+ + n; X h=1 2 ;h ) if < n ; 1 (12) p = 1 i f = n ; 1:
One place where this has an e ect is when a MIXING round follows a MASHING round. Each word R 0], : : : , R 3] is modi ed by a MASH step in turn. At the rst subsequent MIX step R 0] is modi ed by means of addition. By looking at the two additions in isolation one under-estimates the probability of the di erential. In the analysis of RC2 we need to take account of this e ect since it applies to some extent to the MIXING rounds as well as during the transition between MIXING and MASHING rounds. Within the MIXING rounds an intermediate quantity is used as input to a multiplexor function. This reduces the probability that this particular characteristic is followed by a factor of 2 ;h for each m ultiplexor when the Hamming weight of the difference is h. I f w e denote the numberofmultiplexing functions between two successive additions by k then (12) 
The last approximation is reasonable for smaller ( < n ; 3) but would need some correction for larger values of . For k = 0 1 2 3, (17) gives p = 1=2 1=6 1=14 1=30, which should be compared with the respective probabilities of the characteristics we previously derived: 7 In general it is not true that an h-bit di erence goes to a one-bit di erence with such a high probability.
1=4 1=8 1=16 1=32. In the case of two consecutive MIXING rounds we have that k = 3 and so the probability of a one-bit to one-bit di erential across two MIXING rounds is 1=30 2 ;3 = 1 =240.
The e ect we are using here can be extended to a series of additions whereby t h e i n termediate values of interest have di erences with a variety of Hamming weights even though the starting and ending di erence have weight one. Consider three consecutive mixing rounds. Let a be a one-bit di erence in the leftmost words of two inputs and let be the position of that bit, where 0 n ; 1. Let d be the di erence in the leftmost words after three mixing rounds and suppose that h1 and h2 denote the Hamming weights of the leftmost words after one, respectively two, mixing rounds. Then the probability that d is a one-bit di erence can be estimated as follows, where k = 3 and where for simplicity w e h a ve eliminated the term for h = n ; . 
Again the nal approximation requires that is small. For k = 3 p is 2 ;1 (1=15) 2 . W e c a n n o w estimate the probability of the di erential over three mixing rounds by 2 ;1 (1=15) 2 1=8 ' 1=3600. This extends easily to more rounds and in general the probability of a di erential over r mixing rounds is (1=15) r;1 1=16. Note that the MASHING rounds can be passed with probability one. For a more accurate assessment a slight correction should be applied for rounds where the di erence is close to the most signi cant bit, but experimental evidence given below suggests that the expressions derived are reasonable to use. The number of rounds in the table refers to the numberof MIXING rounds used. After ve MIXING rounds an additional MASHING round is inserted as occurs when encrypting with RC2. The nal column is derived as an average over at least ve sets of experiments for each r o w.
# r ounds # p airs/test # right pairs expected # right pairs obtained 3  2 19  146  146  4  2 22  78  79  6  2 29  44  47  7 2 31 12 13 Note that the probability of the di erential obtained in this section does not take i n to account text pairs which h a ve i n ternal di erences in more than one word before they resynchronize. This was observed occasionally during experiments but cases where di erences in more than one word resynchronize are rare and we ignore their impact on our estimates.
Di erential Cryptanalysis of RC2
We arrive at the following estimates for the data required to recover information about the subkey K 0]. Once this subkey word has been recovered the attack is repeated on what would now become a reduced version of RC2. When we take i n to account the key-recovery techniques of Section 3.4 we estimate that a di erential attack o n R C2 with r MIXING rounds (including the MASHING rounds) requires at most 2 4r chosen plaintexts. An attack o n R C2 with 16 MIXING rounds requires use of a di erential with probability at least 2 ;58:7 (\at least" since we h a ve n o t y et accounted for such phenomena as a one-bit di erence in the most significant bit at a MIXING round). In this regard RC2 with 16 MIXING rounds compares favorably to DES (2 47 pairs 1]) and 12-round RC5 (2 44 pairs 3]). It is fair to observe, however, that RC2 is not a fast cipher and an optimized version of DES and 12-round RC5 are both likely to be faster than RC2.
Linear Cryptanalysis of RC2
Linear cryptanalysis has provided the best theoretical attack o n D E S i n terms of data requirements 9]. However, its usefulness on other ciphers is often limited. The aim of such an attack is to relate bits of the plaintext and ciphertext to bits of the key via a linear equation which holds with some probability p. Such an approximation can generally be used to provide an estimate for one bit of the key and more advanced techniques are available to extract more key information 9]. If an approximation holds with probability p then the important q u a n tity for the cryptanalyst is the absolute value of the bias of the approximation b = jp ; 1=2j.
Typically the data required to use such an approximation is given by Across integer addition the best linear approximation involves the least signi cant bit of each q u a n tity, and will hold with probability o n e . T h e multiplexor function x = (R 3] & R 2]) + ( R 3] & R 1]) has linear approximations of varying usefulness. The absolute value of the highest non-trivial bias is 1=4 when averaged over all plaintexts. In a slight abuse of notation we will consider a 16-bit word x as a vector in Z 16 2 and we will use the 16-bit quantity to indicate the bits of x that are to be used in a linear approximation. This is most conveniently described by means of the scalar product of two v ectors. Thus the f0 1g-vector will be used to denote the speci c bits of x to be used in an approximation and x is the value of these bits combined using exclusive-or. Useful linear approximations across the multiplexor are of the form
where Hwt( ) = 1 . More generally approximations to the multiplexor function with non-zero bias have the form
where is the bitwise inclusive-or of and and is either 0 or it consists of ones in positions where either or have ones. The greater the value of Hwt( ) the lower the absolute value of the bias of the approximation.
The following approximation to the rst MIX step (which includes the cyclic swap of the R ] w ords) might be useful
This has a bias of absolute value 1=4. The following steps require no approximation and there appears to be no better non-trivial linear approximations for a complete MIXING round. We m i g h t illustrate this approximation in the following way: 
The E ectiveness of Linear Cryptanalysis
The typical way to measure the e ectiveness of linear cryptanalysis is to appeal to the so-called piling-up lemma 8]. By doing this, we are lead to estimate a bias of 2 ;2 2 ;3 2 ;3 2 2 = 2 ;6 for our approximation to the rst two MIXING rounds of RC2. In the case of RC2, however, routine use of the piling-up lemma can lead to misleading results.
As an example, suppose that the two subkeys used in steps one and three of round two are zero. In isolation the approximation to step one (A1, say) holds with probability 5=8. In step three we nd that the 8 Note that the whole issue of key-dependence in linear cryptanalysis is a complex one that is rarely addressed in detail.
second approximation (A2, s a y) involves bits that previously determined whether A1 held. Analysis shows that the probability that A2 holds given that A1 held is 13=20 and not 5=8 when A2 is considered in isolation. Furthermore, the probability that A2 doesn't hold when A1 doesn't hold is 5=12 instead of 3=8. So when the two approximations are combined the probability that the combined approximation to round two holds is (5=8 13=20) + (3=8 5=12) = 9=16 which leads to a bias of 1=16. This is greater than the 1=32 predicted by use of the piling-up lemma. Much of the complicated interaction between the two approximations is due to the role of addition in the cipher. As an example, if we s u p p o s e that approximation A1 holds, then it can be shown that the probability that the least signi cant b i t o f R 2] is equal to zero is 11=20. Since this bit plays a pivotal role in determining whether A2 holds it is no surprise that the piling-up lemma gives misleading results. For the user of RC2 there is circumstantial evidence that linear cryptanalysis is unlikely to pose a threat to RC2. Such attacks appear to be ine ective for ciphers that mix integer addition and bitwise operations unless the approximation can be limited to the least signi cant bits across an addition 6]. Such a restriction appears unlikely as an extension of the current a p p r o ximation into a third MIXING Nevertheless, there are complex interactions between the individual steps of RC2 and these often provide unintuitive results. In particular we h a ve discovered cases where adding a non-trivial approximation to an existing approximation actually boosts the absolute value of the bias. (Such a n example can be found in step 3 above when the subkeys in all rounds are set to zero.) Under such circumstances the true e ectiveness of linear cryptanalysis in attacking RC2 has to remain an open problem.
Conclusions
In this paper we h a ve described the block cipher RC2. While the cipher is perhaps slower than other alternatives available today, it does appear to o er e ective resistance to di erential cryptanalysis. Our attempts to apply linear cryptanalysis to RC2 have p r o vided some intriguing insights, but are as yet insu cient to determine the actual resistance of RC2 to linear cryptanalysis this remains an open problem. It is important that RC2 continues to come under close scrutiny from the cryptanalytic community.
